











<>3 :r> :>>' .>-^ 

' -.'''^ :-^ D3330"'^ 
>~>J^ 33r> -S-^^ . 3 






,^^^> --i:>>^ -i>:^ =3^- - 

-J^J'^^'^^ ^ ^ ^ -^^ ^^^ >3^"3 



■> _3>_^ v):>:.> >r>_ 

> ^>:^ ^ ^ :>^ > or 

> ^^ 5> ^^> :>3Z 
3 ^>:> 3 3 :3i> 3 3i> 

» ~:> 3 >r> 3 3"^ 



:>'^'5 



^ 3 :3> >3=^._ ^ ._ 



3J> ^ 

>3> r 






q»> 3:>Xfr 



)► 3 ^ ^> "^" °^ : 
• > j:> 3» :3»3r 

^ 3>> ,3& ~"SS»Z> 

>3 3:> :» ,^3s 

:> 3 3>3> >33Q 
_^ "y 3^3> -^ --—* 



HIBRARY OF CONGRESS.! 

# # 

f [SMITHSONIAN DEPOSIT.] f 



I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. | 



3fe I 

^ 33q»3 3r=> 

:^J3^> 3 - 3» -i 



>>^ 3 3 



> ^ ^^> :3 3^> 3 



33d :33^» 

3:?3 'I>^"^» 

>33 :r>^^^> 

v2>3 ":r>^3>> 

3-^:^3 '3>V5» 

:^^>3 'T-»i» 

3^30 .3->3» 

3 153 3-I3> 

„33D 33> 

^3 13 13 3 
Z>3 >:3 33>^ 
I> 3 3:3 -3 3 
O 3 33 33 
:> 3 33 33 
333 

3 33- 3 3 
> 3 3^3 3^3 



335 

33: 

33 
33 

33 
3 30 

3>1 



3:^ 



> 33^ 3 

^ >3::> > 



> 3 1» 3 

? ? :> 3 



> 3 33^ 



3 3 3 



3> 
3>: 
3> 3 
3> 3 

3> 1 

>3 1 

3 

3^ 
13 : 

>3 1 



3 O 1^ < 

:, ^ 3>3^ 3 



^ 33 )>y> l>3^ > 3 ^ 

3> 33 3 ' ^>J> 3 3 )52> 
3> 3^ ::» ^^^3^ > 3> 3 



2> 3i\-^ -<i>»V2>i^-:> 



>>>-.;>, ^ _::> 3 3 1> ^i-^ 3 
.^1^ ' 3 3 ^> 3 3 3 >^ ^ 

^i&^ 3 j»-i> ^ 3 :> >• ^ .-^:> 
3'3l>^ 33Z> 3 3 3 '3 > X> 



» 3> 
333 



^3or> 



3-> 3'3>i:> 

3^ 3^.:?»3 

3^ 33^^ .> 
3 > 3-^-2»3> 



>»^3 

1» 33 

• -> 3 

^■:>3"3 
i:>3 3> 



3.:i>^) jy ~- 
> D >^ i> . > 
3 ^> .V' J> ,^ 
33)3j> j^ 



^ ^iM'-^y 3 ^3.3 3 ■> .> a -s. j> 

3 330> 3 >^ 1>^^ :) ^v>D 

3 3i»'i>> 3 > '-> 3 >'l1^' -^3 

3 >''^^"> ~> > 3 3 > 33 3> 

3 0»3> 3 ' 3 3>3)^ -)3 



3 )^3> :) > 

3 o»3> 3 ' 

) -».!» ^ ) 

. >^)»> > ) 

3 3 533 3 3 



.3 303 3 -] 
> :> ■> 3 3 i 

> ^ ^3 > 3 

■J >■ ^50 3 > 



>> 3 • -^ y:J^ ' "" 
~3 3 ' > - .^;-> ■:' 

3 ^ ^^ ^ 3^ : 

>3 ) i >^ :: 

•3> ) ^' 'y-. 
» "> ■' r^ 

3)> .^^ ^^ 

>>3^ .> '> ' ^ 
>33^^ :^3> 



• >:>3> 23*)3~ 

^•^ •>33^ "33i> -^ 

^^--^ >> 3T\> ^ 

_ 3^^).>T> ^ 

- >3> y) >3 3 * 
»3> >^ 33 :3 

3»l»3^>. o;^ ^ 

'-^><*'' 3 3 
^3> S 3^ 
>3> 3 3 

3ifc». ^ ^ 

>» 3 3 

3^» ^^ 

■ ^ • :>3> 3 3 



3 1> ^>^ 3 3 
3 3 3 >3 , 

3 3 3 3 3 

3 3 3» >3 3 
3 3 ^^^^ 3 : 
3 3 .^^ 3 .. 
3 3 3 3 3 
- 3 »-^^3 3 
_ 3 3 3 
3 3 3 
> 3 3 ^ 

. :> 3 - '3 i> ■ 



3 3 3 

^ ^ > > 

>>3 3 -! 
> ~> ^ > 

>>3 3 ■■■3 

33^ 3 3 :> 
>-X»3 3 -3 

^3&> ~> > >, 






^>-»3>3 >::>^ 3> 



^* -•^^^ ) ■:> 



3v 3 



>>>^0 3 33 33^3 
>> -,■;>>>> > - 3 >>>^3 



>>3 '3 

"3^) -3 



33 3 

3^T> ^ 















r>>' s>x>::: 















3^ ^^. 



:,^ y^ ^>^ 

^-J^?^^>:> Ji> 3> .>"^ >^^ ^ v^ 
5> o:^ 5). >D» ^» _3 :^ ^^>v ^i:> --^ 









J>.0 > .Dl»3»>"^ ' ^ £^> 






^3 ^y 



3^3 77> >i^. 



>^ z»)ix>^> mcBP Z>>z% 
^^' _:>:> J»::s> s>^^ ^-^^-^^ 



Oi'3> ■T^'2^ 3./:).'> i3:» ^5S> Z3 

'^ d:jp yim^z>:) )s>,:ss> >^'::> 

^ '"^-^ :J> ;> .3 xs?* > s>y~ 






> 7> O r> 

3 ^ : 






3 l> 















))yz> y)wy> :; 



1..3 ;3^ , 






y> >yy> 



:->yi> 3 



L^^^^^^S^ ^^^^y^^y>' >.fe .:3>-:tz> 

*'^^ :i>^\:2:^L>:t>. _:5^|> ^ >yy^ 

y^^ y>^ZX>y>yi> I> y>j>z>y y> y> 3 
^■:.j^;5 :o.3^'^fe>:i>:>>-.v^ ':z> j>:j>>3:>:> 3>-3\:^ 

> - ' :3> 3 j>j " "i::aK>o ^ x>~^ y>'^:^ !>"> ^^- 

:>::j8) ->>5>o ^.^:^ 33^^ 

f> '^»3>3> ^^^I> ^-'^^-^^^ 



/ 



^:^IR A¥ILLIAM HAMILTON 

^ 7 

"O ' AND 



"" J HIS PHILOSOPHY. 



FROM THE 



PRINCETON REVIEW, OCTOj^^W55. 



W' 




55 







^ 



FROM THE 



PRINCETON REYIEW, 



OCTOBER, 1855. 



^ ♦ » » > 



The Works of Thomas Beid, D. D, Preface, Notes, and 
Supplementary Dissertations. By Sir William Hamilton, 
Bart. Edinburgh: 1846. 

Discussions on Philosophy/ and Literature, Education and 
University Reform, By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Se- 
cond Edition, enlarged. London : 1853. 

Though of Lord Bacon it was said, by his friend Dr. Har- 
vey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, " he writes 
philosophy like a Lord Chancellor," it must be admitted, Sir 
William Hamilton writes it like a philosopher. For he both 
thinks and writes, more like a pure intelligence, than any man 
in the history of speculation. In the first place, his diction is 
the most concise, the most accurate, the most direct, the most 
compact, and the most vigorous ever used by any writer on 
philosophy. Familiar with all systems of philosophy ever pro- 
posed, and their criticisms expository, supplementary and ad- 
verse, and a master of the languages, in which both the philo- 
sophies and the criticisms have been written ; he has discovered 
how much of their errors can be ascribed to the deficiencies of 
language, both as an instrument and as a vehicle of philosophi- 
cal thought ; and he has, accordingly, formed a language for 
1 



himself, adequate to the exigencies of the highest thinking, in 
the new career of philosophy which he has inaugurated. And 
his learning, in every department of knowledge supplementary 
of philosophy, or auxiliary to it, is so abundant, that there 
seems to be not even a random thought of any value, which 
has been dropped along any, even obscure, path of mental 
activity, in any age or country, that his diligence has not re- 
covered, his sagacity appreciated, and his judgment husbanded 
in the stores of his knowledge. And, in discussing any ques- 
tion of philosophy, his ample learning enables him to classify 
all the different theories which have, at successive periods, 
been invented to explain it ; and generally, indeed we may say 
always, he discovers, by the light reciprocally shed from the 
theories, ideas involved in them which their respective advo- 
cates had not discriminated ; thereby giving greater accuracy 
to the theories than they had before. By this mode of discus- 
sion, we have the history of doctrines concentrated into a focus 
of elucidation. And the uses of words, and the mutations in 
their meaning, in different languages, are articulately set forth : 
thereby enhancing the accuracy and certainty of our footsteps 
on the slippery paths of speculation. And his own genius for 
original research is such, that no subtlety of our intelligent 
nature, however evasive, no relation however indirect or re- 
mote, no manifestation however ambiguous or obscure, can 
escape or elude his critical diagnosis. Add to all this ; his 
moral constitution, both by nature and by education, is harmo- 
nious with his intellectual, imparting to his faculties the energy 
of a well-directed will, and the wisdom of a pure love of truth. 
Therefore it is, that in the writings of Sir William Hamilton 
there is nothing of that vacillation in doctrine which results 
from unbalanced faculties. He has built upon the same foun- 
dation from the beginning. Another notable characteristic is 
his extraordinary individuality. He seems, in no degree, un- 
der the influence of what is called the doctrine of the historical 
development of human intelligence. He confronts the whole 
history of doctrines, and with a cold critical eye, surveys them 
as the products of individual minds, and not as the evolutions 
of a total humanity. Of eclecticism, there is in his creed, not 
the smallest taint. Truth seems to him the same everywhere. 



unmodified hj times. Such is the marvellous man, of whose 
philosophy we propose to give some account. 

The history of philosophy seems, to the superficial observer, 
but the recurrence of successive cycles of the same problems, 
the same discussions, and the same opinions. He sees, in 
modern philosophy, only the repetition of the dreams of the 
earliest Greek speculators. Philosophy is to him but labour 
upon an insoluble problem. To the competent critic, however, 
it presents a far different view. He sees, in each cycle, new 
aspects of the problems, new relations in the discussions, and 
new modes in the opinions — all indicating an advancement, 
however unequal and halting at times, towards the truth. 
Here then is, at once, evinced the supreme importance of an 
enlightened philosophical criticism. It is the preparative and 
precursor of further progress. The different doctrines which, 
in successive ages, have been elicited, are so many experiments, 
furnishing, to the enlightened critic, indications more or less 
obvious of the true solutions of the problems of philosophy. 

Sir William Hamilton is the prince of critics in philosophy. 
In him philosophical criticism has compassed its widest scope, 
and reached its highest attainments. He is the critic of all 
ages, equally at home in all. He has sifted all of ancient, all 
of mediaeval, and all of modern thought, with the most delicate 
sieve ever used by any critic ; and while he has winnowed 
away the chaff, he has lost not a grain of truth. The barriers 
of different languages have not excluded him from a single 
field : he unlocked the gates of one as easily as another, and 
entered where he list. With principles of criticism as broad 
as nature, with learning as extensive as the whole of what has 
been written on philosophy, with a knowledge of words, and of 
the things which they denote or are intended to denote, mar- 
vellously accurate and co-extensive with the whole literature of 
speculation, with a logic both in its pure theory and modified 
applications, adequate to every need of intelligence, whether 
in detecting the fallacies or expounding the truths of doctrine, 
and with a genius exactly suited to use, with the greatest 
effect, these manifold accomplishments, he stands pre-eminent 
amongst the critics of philosophy. As we have seen how he 
unravels the network of entangled discussions, discriminating 



the confusions by purifying the doctrines through a more ade- 
quate conception and expression of them, often correcting the 
text of the Greek writer, which for centuries had baffled the 
grammarians, by the light of the doctrine of the author, and in 
the sequel making the truth educed the starting-point for new 
development of doctrine, we have admired the matchless abili- 
ties of the critic, until we should have been exhausted in being 
dragged along the labyrinths of his mighty ratiocination, had 
we not been refreshed at every turn by the new light of truth 
disclosed by the master who was conducting the marvellous 
enterprise of thought. Bentley did not do more to enlarge the 
scope, and enrich the learning of British literary criticism, 
when, by his dissertations on the Epistles of Phalaris, he raised 
it from the platitudes of the grammarian and the rhetorician to 
the compass, the life, the interest, and the dignity of philologi- 
cal and historical disquisition, than Sir William Hamilton has 
done to give profundity, subtlety, comprehensiveness, and eru- 
dition to British philosophical criticism, by his contributions to 
the Edinburgh Review, These articles mark an era, not only 
in British but in European criticism in every department of 
philosophy — metaphysics, psychology, and logic. They were 
translated into the languages of the continent, and their stu- 
pendous learning, matchless subtlety, and ruthless ratiocina- 
tion, received everywhere unbounded admiration. The very 
first article, the one on the doctrine of the infinite-absolute of 
Cousin, utterly subverted the fundamentals of the proud specu- 
lations of Germany, and fully exposed the absurdity of the 
attempt of Cousin to conciliate them with the humble Scottish 
philosophy of common sense. The continental philosophers 
saw that a critic had arisen, who, by the might and the majesty 
of his intellect, and the vastness of his erudition, gave dignity 
to the humble doctrine which he advocated, and they had all 
along despised. They began to feel, 

" A chiel's amang us, takin notes, 
And faith, he'll prent it." 

But Sir William Hamilton, the critic, is pnly the precursor 
of Sir William Hamilton the philosopher. His criticism is but 
the preparative of his philosophy. They, however, move on 



together. The state of the philosophy of the world marie this 
necessary. The calling of Socrates was not more determined 
by the condition of thought in his time, than the labours of Sir 
William Hamilton are by the philosophical needs of this age. 
His erudition and critical skill are as much needed as his 
matchless genius for original speculation. Either, without the 
other, would have been comparatively barren of results. And 
his preferen-ce, like Aristotle, for logic rather than the other 
branches of philosophy, is the very affection that is desiderated 
in the great thinker of this age. It seems to be supposed by 
some, who even pretend to have studied the philosophy of Sir 
William Hamilton, that he has merely rehabilitated the doc- 
trines of Reid and Stewart. It might, with much more show 
of truth be said, that Newton only reproduced the discoveries of 
Copernicus and Kepler. For the philosophy of Sir William 
Hamilton is a greater stride beyond that of his Scottish prede- 
cessors, than the discoveries and deductions of Newton are be- 
yond those of Copernicus and Kepler. Let us then, as far as 
his published writings and our limits will permit, show what 
Sir William has done directly to advance philosophy. 

With Bacon began a movement in modern philosophy, which 
parallels that begun by Aristotle in ancient,* Aristotle in- 
augurated the deductive process ; Bacon inaugurated the induc- 
tive. These are the distinctive features of those systems of 
philosophy which they advocated ; and they are in accordance 
with the spirit of philosophizing in the respective eras to which 
they belonged. Ancient philosophy was more a deduction from 
principles ; modern philosophy is more an inquiry into principles 
themselves. Aristotle and Bacon both make logic the para- 
mount branch of philosophy ; and the forms of the understand- 
ing the limits of the knowable. Sir William Hamilton's philo- 

* When we say that Bacon and Aristotle began these respective movements, we 
do not mean literally, that the movements originated with them, but only that, like 
Luther's in the Reformation, their labours were so signal and paramount, in these 
movements, as to be associated pre-eminently with them. No great change ever 
originates with the person who becomes the most conspicuous in it, in the great 
spectacle of history. It always has antecedents, produced by the agency of inferior 
persons. We, therefore, beg, that everywhere, in this article, the principle of this 
note may qualify our general remarks, even in regard to the claims of originality, 
which we prefer for Sir William Hamilton, unless our remarks preclude qualifica- 
tion. 



6 

sophj Is a preparative and an initial towards the conciliation of 
the systems of Aristotle and Bacon. Logic, with him as with 
them, is the paramount branch of philosophy; and his labours 
all tend to reconcile induction with deduction, and unify in one 
method these two great processes of thought. His philosophy 
is, in fact, a climacteric reclamation, vindication, and develop- 
ment of the one perennial philosophy of common sense, which, 
like the one true faith, is preserved amidst all schismatic aber- 
rations, and vindicated as the only true philosophy. 

It is in the essential unity of human reason returning again 
and again, from temporary aberrations in different ages, into 
the same discernments and convictions, that we have the means 
of verifying the true catholic philosophy. Though there may 
be nothing in the mutual relations of men, at any given time, 
nor in the mutual relations of successive generations, that 
necessarily determines an uninterrupted advance towards truth, 
yet, notwithstanding the occasional wide-spread and long pro- 
tracted prevalence of error, the reason of man has hitherto vin- 
dicated itself in the long run, and proved that, though the 
newest phase of thought may not, at all times, be the truest, 
yet the truest will prevail at last, and come out at the goal of 
human destiny, triumphant over all errors. This is the drift 
of the history of human opinion as interpreted by enlightened 
criticism. Sometimes skepticism, recognizing no criterion of 
truth ; sometimes idealism, knowing nothing but images in 
ceaseless change ; sometimes pantheism, dissolving all individu- 
ality, both material and spiritual, in the tides of universal 
being ; sometimes materialism, believing nothing beyond mate- 
rial nature, and that man is only a more perfect species of 
mammalia, and human affairs but the highest branch of natural 
history ; and other forms of error, each with its peculiar mo- 
menta and criteria of knowledge, have in reiterated succession, 
in different ages of the world, prevailed as systems of philoso- 
phy ; yet the reason of man has, nevertheless, under the gui- 
dance of some master mind, returned to the one perennial phi- 
losophy of common sense, and reposed In the natural conviction 
of mankind, that an external world exists as the senses testify, 
and that there is in man an element which lifts him above the 



kingdom of nature, and allies him in responsible personal indi- 
viduality with a divine, eternal, and personal God. 

The great office of the critic of philosophy, at this day, is to 
trace the footsteps of this perennial philosophy through the 
history of human opinion in all its manifold mutations, perver- 
sions, and aberrations ; and to note its features, observe the 
paths it walks in, and its method and criteria of truth. This 
Sir William Hamilton has done. He has shown that the doc- 
trine of common sense, as the basis of all philosophy, has pre- 
vailed for more than two thousand years. He has adduced one 
hundred and six witnesses, Greek, Roman, Arabian, Italian, 
Spanish, French, British, German, and Belgian, to its truth. 
Amongst the many Greek witnesses, Aristotle is found, amongst 
the Roman, Cicero, amongst the Italians, Aquinas, amongst the 
French, all the great philosophers from Des Cartes to Cousin, 
both inclusive ; amongst the Germans, Leibnitz, Kant, Jacobi, 
and even Fichte, with a host of others; thus showing, that 
what is sometimes thought, even by those from whom we might 
expect better things, to be the superficial foundation of British 
philosophy, is in truth the only foundation on which the reason 
of man can repose. Philosophers, amidst all their efi'orts to 
break away from the common beliefs of mankind, have at last 
been compelled to come back to them as the only ultimate cri- 
terion of truth. "Fichte (says Sir W. Hamilton,) is a more 
remarkable, because a more reluctant confessor to the para- 
mount authority of belief than even Kant. Departing from 
the principle common to him, and philosophers in general, that 
the mind cannot transcend itself, Fichte developed, with the 
most admirable rigour of demonstration, a scheme of idealism 
the purest, simplest, and most consistent which the history of 
philosophy exhibits. And so confident was Fichte in the neces- 
sity of his proofs, that on one occasion he was provoked to im- 
precate eternal damnation on his head, should he ever swerve 
from any, even the least of the doctrines which he had so victo- 
riously established. But even Fichte, in the end, confesses 
that natural belief is paramount to every logical proof, and 
that his own idealism he could not believe." 

With the great fact before us, so triumphantly reclaimed 
and vindicated by Sir William Hamilton, that philosophers 



8 

have never been able to find any other criterion of truth than 
the common sense of mankind, we will now proceed to show 
what is its doctrine. 

The philosophy of common sense is the doctrine, in its de- 
velopment and applications, that our primary beliefs are the 
ultimate criterion of truth. It postulates, that consequents 
cannot, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of antecedents: 
but that demonstration must ultimately rest upon propositions, 
which in the view of certain primary beliefs of the mind, neces- 
sitate their own admission. These primary beliefs, as primary, 
must of course be inexplicable, being the highest light in the 
temple of mind, and borrowing no radiance from any higher 
cognition by which their own light can be illuminated. Be- 
hind these primary beliefs the mind cannot see — all is nega- 
tion ; because, while these primary beliefs are the first energy 
of the mind, they are also its limitation. The primary facts of 
intelligence would not be original, were they revealed to us 
under any other form than that of necessary belief. 

As elements of our mental constitution, as essential condi- 
tions of intelligence itself, these primary beliefs must, at least 
in the first instance, be accepted as true. Else, we assume 
that the very root of our intelligence is a lie. All must admit 
some original bases of knowledge in the mind itself, and must 
assume that they are true. 

The argument from common sense is therefore simply to 
show, that to deny a given proposition would involve a denial 
of a primary belief, an original datum of consciousness ; and as 
the primary belief or original datum of consciousness must be 
received as veracious, the proposition necessitated by it must 
be received as true also. 

It is manifest, that in arguing on the basis of our primary 
beliefs, they cannot be shown to be mendacious, unless it be 
demonstrated that they contradict each other, either imme- 
diately in themselves or mediately in their consequences. Be- 
cause, there being no higher criterion by which to test their 
veracity, it can only be tested by agreement or contradiction 
between themselves. 

We will now apply this doctrine, and in discussing the appli- 
cation, we will explicate the doctrine more fully. In the act 



of sensible perception we are, equally and at tlie same time, 
and in the same indivisible act of consciousness, cognizant of 
ourself as a perceiving subject, and of an external reality as 
the object perceived, which are apprehended as a synthesis 
inseparable in the cognition, but contrasted to each other :'n 
the concept as two distinct existences. All this is incontestaKy 
the deliverance of consciousness in the act of sensible percep- 
tion. This all philosophers, without exception, admit as Sifaet, 
But then, all, until Reid, deny the truth of the deliverance. 
They maintain that we only perceive representations within 
ourselves, and by a perpetual illusion we mistake these repre- 
sentations for the external realities. And Reid did not fully 
extricate himself from the trammels of this opinion. For 
while he repudiated the notion, that we perceive representa- 
tions distinct from the mind though within the mind, he fell 
into the error, that we are only conscious of certain changes in 
ourselves which suggest the external reality. But Sir William 
Hamilton has, by the most masterly subtlety of analysis, incon- 
testably shown, that we are directly conscious of the external 
objects themselves, according to the belief universal in the 
common sense of mankind. 

It is manifest, that the whole question resolves itself into 
one of the veracity of consciousness. All admit that conscious- 
ness does testify to the fact that we perceive the external 
reality. To doubt this is to doubt the actuality of the fact of 
c<ynsciousness, and consequently to doubt the doubt itself, which 
is a contradiction, and subverts itself. The data then of con- 
sciousness, simply as facts, or actual manifestations and deliver- 
ances, cannot be denied without involving a contradiction; and 
therefore, the principle of contradiction, which we have shown 
is the only one to be applied to the solution of the question, 
recoils upon the skeptic himself, and makes doubt impossible. 
But then, the facts or deliverances of consciousness considered 
as testimonies to the truth of facts beyond their own phenome- 
nal reality, are not altogether to be excluded from the domain 
of legitimate philosophical discussion. For this proposition 
by no means, like the other, involves a self-contradiction ; and 
thereby repels even the possibility of doubt. Therefore philo- 
sophers, while they admit the fact of the testimony of con- 
2 



10 

sciousness deny its truth. The dispute is not as to what is 
said, but as to the truth of what is said. 

As then, it has been admitted, that ih.Q fact is an affirmation 
of our intelligent nature, its mendacity cannot be consistently 
assumed ; for upon the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in 
omnibus, it would impeach the fact itself as an affirmation of 
nature, which we have shown involves a contradiction, and is 
therefore impossible. It is clear then, that the burden of 
proof, in impeaching the absolute veracity of consciousness, lies 
upon those denying it. And as we have shown, that the 
attempt to prove its mendacity has in all ages failed, and that 
all the most schismatic and skeptical have at last found repose 
for the struggling intellect only in the testimony of our pri- 
mary beliefs, we are compelled by analysis, and by history, to 
acknowledge the doctrine of common sense the one catholic 
and perennial philosophy. 

Here the question obtrudes itself into our view. What is the 
logical significance of our primary beliefs f and it is a question 
of paramount importance. Perhaps, in the answer to this ques- 
tion, we may differ from Sir William Hamilton ; and, there- 
fore, it is, that we wish to signalize it. 

It is implied in the doctrine of primary beliefs, that, at the 
root of every primordial act of the mind, there is a principle or 
law guaranteeing the procedure. For example, the initial act, 
from which induction starts, is guaranteed by such a principle 
or law of intelligence — the principle of philosophical presump- 
tion. Now, in order to distinguish these principles or laws 
from the universal truths which are generalized from individual 
truths of fact, they are called universal truths of intelligence. 
Now, we prefer to call these principles, laivs of intelligence as 
more expressive of their real character, rather than truths of 
intelligence ; because, in the operations of the mind, they are 
regulative and not cogitable, being in fact the poles on which 
thought turns. They are, in our thinking, silent in laws, 
rather than articulate in propositions. 

We think that this is a discrimination that ought not to be 
slighted; and we venture to find fault that Sir William Hamil- 
ton uses the expressions, "fundamental facts," "beliefs," 
"primary propositions," "cognitions at firsthand," as deno- 



11 

ting tlie same primary data of consciousness only from dif- 
ferent points of view. We are not convinced of the propriety 
of his opinion implied in such various designations ; and are 
constrained to believe, that the confusing the distinction, which 
we have endeavoured to indicate, is the initial, the root of that 
cardinal heresy in philosophy which makes all cognition encen- 
tric — makes thought start out from a general notion native to 
the mind. We repudiate the doctrine that there ever is a be- 
lief or a cognition of the mind without its corresponding object. 
The deliverance of the primary and most incomprehensible 
belief is. That its object is. Thought never evades the funda- 
mental antithesis of subject and object, which is the primary 
law of consciousness itself. In no instance is a notion, not 
even that of cause, time, or space, native to the mind, acquired 
from no adequate object, but purely subjective and regulative, 
imposing upon objective thought an illusive interpolation of 
itself. 

We therefore, repeat, that our primary beliefs are not within 
consciousness as comprehended thought, but in consciousness 
as bases of thought. We cannot therefore assent, that, in dif- 
ferent points of view, they may or may not be regarded as 
cognitions or propositions. We think they have not the equi- 
vocal character, which the ambiguous and various designations 
applied to them, by Sir William Hamilton, seem to us to indi- 
cate. They are but modes of one unifying consciousness, not 
rising, in degree of intellection, to cognitions. 

But to call them, "primary propositions," is what we chiefly 
object to. There are primary propositions, undoubtedly, which 
in the view of our primary beliefs, necessitate their own admis- 
sion: but then, they are not to be confounded with the pri- 
mary beliefs themselves. They are made up of a plurality of 
primary beliefs unified in a common conviction in conscious- 
ness, and articulated in language. The point of our objection 
is, to every form and semblance of the doctrine, that all know- 
ing is through previous knowledge, (which will be considered 
in the sequel,) instead of merely through the power of knowing. 

But to return from this digression : And while Sir William 
Hamilton thus points out the bases and the elements of truth, 
he exhibits the canons by which philosophical research is to be 



12 

conducted. As Bacon, in the first book of the Novum Orga- 
num^ exposed the sources of error in physical inquiry, and laid 
down precautionary rules for conducting future investigation, 
so Sir William Hamilton has enounced maxims for conducting 
the loftier and far more difficult research into our intellectual 
nature. And his philosophy is, in this particular, the consum- 
mation of that of Bacon. It explores the depths of conscious- 
ness, and educes those primary beliefs and fundamental laws 
of intelligence which Bacon merely assumed in his philosophy. 
Sir William Hamilton has lighted his torch at the lamps of 
both induction and deduction, and it burns with their combined 
light; and therefore it is, that he has been able to penetrate 
depths in the abysses of thought, which to Bacon and Aristotle 
were unfathomable darkness. How, in the spirit of Bacon, is 
the following admonition ! " No philosopher has ever formally 
denied the truth, or disclaimed the authority of consciousness ; 
but few or none have been content implicitly to accept, and 
consistently to follow out its dictates. Instead of humbly re- 
sorting to consciousness to draw from thence his doctrines and 
their proof, each dogmatic speculator looked only into con- 
sciousness, there to discover his preadopted opinions. In phi- 
losophy men have abused the code of natural, as in theology, 
the code of positive revelation; and the epigraph of a great 
Protestant divine on the book of Scripture is certainly not less 
applicable to the book of consciousness : 

Hie liber est in quo quserit sua dogmata quisque; 
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua." 

And Hamilton, like Bacon, is not at all dismayed by the past 
failures in philosophy ; but with the proud hopes of a great 
mind, conscious of the power of truth, he anticipates mighty 
triumphs in future for that philosophy which he has shown to 
have prevailed for more than two thousand years. " And yet, 
(says he) although the past history of philosophy has, in a 
great measure, been only a history of variation and error ; yet 
the cause of the variation being known, we obtain a valid 
ground of hope for the destiny of philosophy in future. Be- 
cause, since philosophy has hitherto been inconsistent with 



13 

itself, only in being inconsistent with the dictates of our na- 
tural beliefs — 

« For Truth is catholic and Nature one ;' — 

it follows, that philosophy has simply to return to natural con- 
sciousness, to return to unity and truth. 

" In doing this, we have only to attend to three maxims or 
precautions : 

" 1. That we admit nothing, not either an original datum of 
consciousness, or the legitimate consequence of such datum ; 

" 2. That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, 
and all their legitimate consequences ; and 

" 3. That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity, 
neither disturbed nor mutilated, and in its relative place, 
whether of pre-eminence or subordination." 

But Sir William does not stop his directions for investiga- 
tion with these maxims. He gives marks, by which we can 
distinguish our original from our derivative convictions — by 
which we can determine what is, and what is not, a primary 
datum of consciousness. These marks or characters are four; — 
1st, their incomprehensihility — 2d, their simplicity — 3d, their 
necessity and absolute universality — 4th, their comparative evi- 
de7ice and certainty. These characters are explicated by him, 
and rendered entirely capable of application to the purpose of 
analyzing thought into its elements. 

But, besides these positive directions for ascertaining truth. 
Sir William Hamilton exposes the very roots of the false sys- 
tems of philosophy which have prevailed in different times. 
As he shows, by the most searching analysis, that the philoso- 
phy of common sense has its root in the recognition of the ab- 
solute veracity of consciousness in sensible perception; so he 
shows, that all philosophical aberrations, or false systems of 
philosophy, have their respective roots either in a full or partial 
denial of its veracity. And he does not deal merely in gene- 
ralities ; but he articulately sets forth five great variations from 
truth and nature, which have prevailed as systems of philoso- 
phy, and shows the exact degree of rejection o/ the veracity of 
consciousness which constitutes the root of each. We are 
thereby enabled to see the roots of these great heresies laid 



14 

bare, and can extirpate them, by the argument from common 
sense. 

Such are the rules which Sir William Hamilton lays down 
for conducting inquiry in the province of mind. They are a 
development of the method of Bacon in its application to psy- 
chology, the highest branch of phenomenal philosophy. 

We now approach a new development of the philosophy of 
common sense, called the philosophy of the conditioned. It 
constitutes the distinguishing feature of the philosophical sys- 
tem of Sir William Hamilton ; and was developed by him to 
satisfy the needs of intelligence in combating the proud and 
vainglorious philosophy of Germany. It is a remarkable 
monument of the largeness, the profundity, and the penetra- 
ting acuteness of his intellect. 

The philosophy of common sense assumes, that consciousness 
is the supreme faculty — in fact, that it is the complement of 
all the faculties — that what are called faculties are but acts of 
consciousness running into each other, and are not separated 
by those lines of demarcation which are imposed upon them by 
language for the needs of thinking about our intelligent nature. 
The supremacy of consciousness was the doctrine of Aristotle, 
of Des Cartes, and of Locke. Reid and Stewart reduced con- 
sciousness, in their system, to a special faculty only co-ordi- 
nate with the others. This heresy Sir William Hamilton, 
amongst his innumerable rectifications and developments of 
Beid's philosophy, has exposed, and by a singular felicity of 
analysis and explication, has restored consciousness to its 
rightful sovereignty over the empire of intelligence. 

Having postulated that consciousness is the highest, and fun- 
damental faculty of the human mind, it becomes necessary, in 
order to determine the nature of human knowledge, to deter- 
mine the nature of consciousness. 

Now, consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of 
the thinking mental self, and an object thought about, in cor- 
relation and limiting each other. It is, therefore, manifest, 
that knowledge, in its most fundamental and thoroughgoing 
analysis, is discriminated into two elements in contrast of each 
other. These elements are appropriately designated, the sub- 
ject and the object, the first applying to the conscious mind 



15 

knowing, and the last, to that which is known. And all that 
pertains to the first is called subjective, and all that pertains to 
the last is called objective. 

Philosophy is the science of knowledge. Therefore, philoso- 
phy must especially regard the grand and fundamental discri- 
mination of the two primary elements of the subjective and 
objective, in. any theory of knowledge it may propound. 

Now, the first and fundamental problem, which presents 
itself in the science of knowledge is, What can we know ? 
Upon the principles of the philosophy of common sense, the 
solution of the problem is found, by showing what are the con- 
ditions of our knowledge. These conditions, according to the 
thoroughgoing fundamental analysis of our knowledge just 
evinced, arise out of the nature of both of the two elements of 
our knowledge, the subjective and the objective, 

Aristotle, who did so much towards analyzing human thought 
into its elements, strove also to classify all objects real under 
their ultimate identifications or categories in relation to thought. 
In modern times, Kant endeavoured to analyze intelligence into 
its ultimate elements in relation to its objects, and to show in 
these elements the basis of all thinking, and the guarantee of 
all certainty. Aristotle's categories, though extremely incom- 
plete, and indeed, we may say bungling, as they confound de- 
rivative with simple notions, did something for correct thinking 
in pointing out, with more exactness, the relations of objects 
real to thought. But Kant, making a false division of intelli- 
gence itself into reason and understanding, blundered at the 
threshold, and while he analyzed reason into its supposed pecu- 
liar elements, to which he gave the Platonic name of Ideas, he 
analyzed understanding into its supposed peculiar elements, 
and gave them the Aristotelic name of Categories. Kant's 
analysis of our intelligence into its pure forms, made the hu- 
man mind a fabric of mere delusion. The ideas of reason he 
proposed as purely subjective and regulative, and yet delu- 
sively positing themselves objectively in thought. And so too, 
in like manner, are his categories of understanding expounded 
as deceptive. His philosophy is thus rendered, at bottom, a 
system of absolute skepticism. 

It is seen, from this account of them, that Aristotle's Gate- 



16 

gories or Predicaments, are exclusively objective, of things 
understood; and that those of Kant are exclusively subjective, 
of the mind understanding. Each is therefore one-sided. 

Sir William Hamilton, discriminating more accurately than 
his predecessors, the dual nature of thought, has distinguished 
its two fundamental elements, the subjective and the objective, 
by a thoroughgoing analysis, and at the same time has 
observed that these elements are ever held together in a syn- 
thesis which constitutes thought in its totality. He has there- 
fore endeavoured to accomplish, in one analysis of thought, 
■what Aristotle and Kant failed to do by their several but par- 
tial analyses. As thought is constituted of both a subjective 
and an objective element, the conditions of the thinkable or of 
thinking must be the conditions of both knowledge and exis- 
tence — of the possibility of knowing, both from the nature of 
thought, and from the nature of existence; and must therefore 
embrace intelligence in relation to its objects, and objects in 
relation to intelligence, and thus supersede the one-sided pre- 
dicaments of Aristotle and Kant. 

The first step towards discriminating the fundamental con- 
ditions of thought, is to reduce thought itself to its ultimate 
simplicity. This Sir William Hamilton has done, by showing 
that it must be either positive or negative, when viewed subjec- 
tively, and either conditioned or unconditioned when viewed 
objectively. And he has discriminated, and signalized the 
peculiar nature of negative thought, by showing that it is con- 
versant about the unconditioned, while positive thought is con- 
versant about the conditioned. This is a salient point in Sir 
William's philosophy. He shows that the Kantean Ideas of 
pure reason, are nothing but negations or impotences of the 
mind, and are swallowed up in the unconditioned; and that 
the Kantean Categories of the understanding are but subordi- 
nate forms of the conditioned. And while he thus reduces 
the Predicaments of Kant to ultimate elements, he annihi- 
lates his division of our intelligence into reason and under- 
standing. He shows that what Kant calls the reason is in 
fact an impotence, and what he calls the understanding is the 
"whole intellect. 

It had been shown by Aristotle, that negation involves affir- 



IT 

mation — that non-existence can only be predicated by referring 
to existence. This discrimination has become a fruitful princi- 
ple in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. He, therefore, 
begins the announcement of the conditions of the thinkable, 
by showing the nature of negative thought. He shows that 
negative thought is realized only under the condition of rela- 
tivity and positive thinking. For example: we try to think — 
to predicate existence, and find ourselves unable. We then 
predicate incogitability. This incogitability is what is meant 
by negation or negative thought. 

If then negative thinking be the opposite of positive think- 
ing, it must be the violation of one or more of the conditions 
of positive thinking. The conditions of positive thinking are 
two ; 1st. The condition of non-contradiction : 2d. The condi- 
tion of relativity. To think at all, (that is positively, for posi- 
tive thinking is properly the only thinking,) our thinking must 
not involve a contradiction, and it must involve relativity. If it 
involve contradiction, the impossible both in thought and in 
reality results. If the condition of relativity be not purified, 
the impossible in thought only results. 

Now the condition of non-contradiction is brought to bear in 
thinking under three phases constituting three laws: — 1st. The 
law of identity ; 2d. The law of contradiction ; 3d. The law 
of excluded middle. The science of these laws is Logic. 
Thus, is shown the ultimate condition of the thinkable on 
which depends the science of explicative or analytical reason- 
ing. This we shall show fully in the sequel, when we come to 
treat of what Sir William Hamilton has done for Logic. 

The condition of non-contradiction is in no danger of being 
violated in thinking ; therefore its explication is only of theo- 
retical importance. 

The condition of relativity is the important one in thought. 
This condition, in so far as it is necessary, is brought to bear 
under two principal relations; one of which arises from the 
subjective element of thought, the mind thinking (called the 
Relation of Knowledge;) the other arises from the objective 
element of thought, the thing thought about, (called the Rela- 
tion of Existence.) 

The relation of Knowledge arises from the reciprocal relation 
3 



18 

of the subject and the object of thought. Whatever comes into 
consciousness is thought, by us, as belonging to the mental self 
exclusively, or as belonging to the not-self exclusively, or as 
belonging partly to both. 

The relation of Existence arising from the object of thought 
is two-fold : this relation being sometimes intrinsic, and some- 
times extrinsic ; according as it is determined by the qualitative 
or quantitative character of existence. Existence conceived as 
substance and quality, presents the intrinsic relation, called 
qualitative; substance and quality are only thought as mutual 
relatives inseparable in conception. We cannot think either 
separate from the other. 

All that has thus far been said applies to both mind and 
matter. 

The extrinsic relation of Existence is three-fold; and as con- 
stituted by three species of quantity, it may be called quantita- 
tive. It is realized in or by the three quantities, time, space, 
and degree, called respectively, protensive, extensive and inten- 
sive quantity. The notions of time and space are the neces- 
sary conditions of all positive thought. Positive thought can- 
not be realized except in time and space. Degree is not, like 
time and space, an absolute condition of thought. Existence 
is not necessarily thought under degree. It applies only to 
quality and not to quantity; and only to quality, in a res- 
tricted sense which Sir William Hamilton has explicated in his 
doctrine of the qualities of bodies, dividing them into primary, 
secundo-primary, and secondary. 

Of these conditions and their relations in their proper subor- 
dinations and co-ordinations Sir William has presented a table, 
which he calls the Alphabet of Thought. 

Out of the condition of relativity springs the science of 
metaphysics, just as we have indicated that logic springs out 
of the condition of non-contradiction. Thus the respective 
roots ofthe two great cognate branches of philosophy are traced 
to their psychological bases in the alphabet of thought. 

We will now exhibit the metaphysical doctrine, which Sir 
William Hamilton educes from the analysis of thought which 
we have endeavoured to present. And here he elevates the 
philosophy of common sense into the philosophy of the condi- 



19 

tioned, borrowing this appellation from this different point of 
view from which philosophy is considered. The former appel- 
lation is derived from a psychological point of view, the latter 
from a metaphysical — the former from a subjective, the latter 
from an objective. 

It is sufficiently apparent that the condition of relativity 
limits our knowledge. This is the fundamental fact which it 
is proposed to establish. It is proposed to show that of the 
absolute we have no knowledge, but only of the relative. This 
is the whole scope of the philosophy of the conditioned. 

With a view of showing the argument from the philosophy 
of the conditioned, let us turn, for a moment, to the philosophy 
of the absolute, the unconditioned, which is the reverse doctrine, 
and of the refutation of which the conditions of the thinkable 
are adduced as a basis. 

From the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea, the abso- 
lute, the infinite, the unconditioned has been the highest prin- 
ciple of speculation. The great master amongst ancient philo- 
sophers, Aristotle, in accordance with the general drift of his 
philosophy, denied that the Infinite was even an object of thought, 
much less of knowledge. And that profound, and subtle, but 
perverse and parodoxical genius, Kant, who, towards the close 
of the eighteenth century, made the first serious attempt ever 
made, to investigate the nature and origin of the notion of the 
Infinite, maintained that the notion is merely regulative of our 
thoughts ; and declared the Infinite to be utterly beyond the 
sphere of our knowledge. But out of the philosophy of Kant, 
from a hidden germ, grew a more extravagant theory of the 
absolute than any which had before perplexed and astounded 
the practical reason of man. It was maintained by Fichte and 
Schelling — who fell back on the ancient notion, that expe- 
rience, because conversant only about the phenomenal and trans- 
itory, is unworthy of the name of philosophy as incapable of 
being a valid basis of certainty and knowledge — that man has 
a faculty of intellectual intuition which rises above the sphere 
of consciousness, as well as of sense, and enthroning the reason 
of man on the seat of Omniscience, with which it in fact becomes 
identified, surveys existence in its all-comprehensive unity and 
its all-pervading relations, and unveils to us the nature of God, 



20 

and, hj an ontological evolution, explains the derivation of all 
things, from the greatest to the very least. 

This philosophy captivated the brilliant and sympathetic 
genius of M. Cousin, of France, who strove to conciliate and 
harmonize it with the Scottish philosophy of experience as pro- 
mulgated by Reid, with which M. Cousin had been imbued. 
He denied the intellectual intuition of the German philoso- \ 
phers, and claimed that the Infinite was given as a datum in 
consciousness along with its correlative the Finite ; that these 
two notions, being necessarily thought as mutual relatives, 
must therefore be both equally objectively true. These two 
notions and their relations to each other are, at once, the ele- 
ments and the laws of the reason of both man and God, and 
that all this is realized in and through consciousness. This 
theory M. Cousin proclaimed as a powerful eclecticism, which 
conciliated not only what had been before considered counter 
and hostile in the reflections of individual philosophers, but 
also, in the diiferent systems of philosophy preserved in the 
history of the science. Thus, the history of philosophy, with 
its various systems, was shown to be but the growth of one 
regularly developed philosophy, gradually culminating towards 
that one consummate knowledge completed in the all-compre- 
hending eclecticism inaugurated, in the central nation of 
Europe, by M. Cousin in a splendour of discourse worthy of 
the grand doctrine which makes the proud rationalism of Ger- 
many acknowledge its doctrinal affiliation with the humble 
Scottish philosophy of observation. When this doctrine 
reached Scotland, Sir William Hamilton, at once, entered the 
great Olympic of philosophical discussion, and stood forth, as 
the champion of the humble doctrine of common sense, against 
the host of continental thinkers. 

And now, for the first time in the history of philosophy, the 
doctrine of the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, was 
made definite. It was shown, by Sir William Hamilton, that 
so far from the Absolute and the Infinite meaning the same 
thing or notion, they were contradictory opposites ; the Abso- 
lute meaning the unconditional affirmation of limitation, while 
the Infinite means the unconditional negation of limitation — 
the one thus an affirmative, the other a negative. And he 



21 

further showed, that both were but species of the uncondi- 
tioned. The question being thus purified from the inaccuracy 
of language and the confusion of thought ; and it being shown 
that the unconditioned must present itself to the human mind 
in a plural form ; it was seen that the inquiry resolves itself 
into the problem, whether the unconditioned, as either the Ab- 
solute or the Infinite can be realized to the mind of man. Sir 
William Hamilton shows that it cannot. He demonstrates that 
in order to think either alternative, we must think away from 
those conditions of thought under which thought can alone be 
realized; and that, therefore, any attempt to think either the 
Absolute or the Infinite must end in a mere negation of thought. 
These notions are thus shown to be the results of two counter 
imbecilities of the mind — the inability to realize the uncondi- 
tionally limited, and the unconditionally unlimited. The doc- 
trine of M. Cousin is shown to be assumptions, inconsequent, 
and self-contradictory. His Infinite is shown to be, at best, 
only an Indefinite, and therefore a relative. And it is shown, 
by a comprehensive application of the Aristotelic doctrine, that 
the knowledge of opposites is one, that so far from the fact, of 
the notions of the Infinite and Finite mutually suggesting each 
other, furnishing evidence of the objective reality of both, it 
should create a suspicion of the reverse. The truth is, the 
searching analysis, to which the doctrine of M. Cousin is sub- 
jected, clearly evinces that he did not at all apprehend the 
state of the question discussed, and in fact was confusing him- 
self in a vicious circle of words. 

And the Intellectual Intuition of Fichte and Schelling is 
shown to be a mere chimera; and his Absolute, a mere 
nothing. As Schelling could never connect his Absolute with 
the Finite in any doctrinal affiliation, so he was unable to dis- 
cover any cognitive transition from the Intellectual Intuition 
to personal consciousness. This hiatus in his theory could not, 
of course, escape the penetrating sagacity of Sir William Ham- 
ilton. It was at once demonstrated as the Intellectual Intuition 
is out of and above consciousness, and to be realized, the phi- 
losopher must cease to be the conscious man Schelling, that if 
even the Intellectual Intuition were possible, still it could only 
be remembered, and ex hypothesij it could not be remembered, 



22 

for memory is only possible under the conditions of the under- 
standing which exclude the Absolute from knowledge. By 
this analysis the Absolute is shown to be a mere mirage in the 
infinite desert of negation, conjured up by a self-delusive imagi- 
nation, conceiting itself wise above the possibilities of thought. 
It may also be argued against the Intellectual Intuition, that 
it is only through the organism of sense, that the mind realizes 
form, the image of an object ; for consciousness in and of itself is 
not an imaging faculty. Now the Intellectual Intuition realizes 
image in the Absolute. It therefore partakes of the character 
of sensation ; and it, in fact, by this analysis stands revealed 
as a sublimated sense postulated, by reason overleaping itself, in 
the attempt to clear the circle of the thinkable. The doctrine 
of the Absolute is thus proved to be a sensational philosophy, 
disguised under terms of supposed high spiritual import. And 
thus, it is demonstrated, that to abandon consciousness as the 
highest faculty, is to necessitate a fall into sensuism, though 
we imagine, all the while, we are soaring on the wings of 
reason, above the region of consciousness. Schelling and 
Condillac are thus found in the darkness of a common error 
listening to the same oracle. And this analysis is confirmed, 
by the fact, that Oken, who, next to Hegel, was the most dis- 
tinguished disciple of Schelling, in his Physio-Philosophy, 
makes the Absolute nothing^ zero ; and then, by pure reason, 
evolves, out of it, all physics ; thus ascribing to a faculty, above 
consciousness, the imaging power of the senses. And Oken 
thus enthrones the physical sciences, as he imagines, on a seat 
above consciousness, when it is, in fact, the footstool of con- 
sciousness, the senses, on which they sit the while. 

Thus was trampled down, this proud doctrine which had 
misled speculation; and philosophy was again brought back 
from its aberrations into the sober paths of common sense. And 
never before did so mighty a champion lead it. For whatever 
else may be thought, in comparing Sir William Hamilton 
with other philosophers, it must be admitted that as a man of 
hostilities, a dialectician and a critic, he is altogether matchless. 

Having given an all-comprehensive example of the argument 
from the philosophy of the conditioned, we will now proceed to 
expound, in outline, the philosophy of the conditioned. The 



23 

distinguislimg feature of this philosophy, the one which most 
articulately enounces its character, is the doctrine of a mental 
Impotence. This doctrine we. will now expound. 

The problem most fruitful of controversy in philosophy is 
that of the distinction between experiential and non-experien- 
tial notions and judgments. Some philosophers contend that 
there is no such distinction ; but that all legitimate notions and 
judgments are experiential. And those, who have admitted the 
distinction have quarrelled about the criterion of the distinction, 
Leibnitz, at last, established the quality of necessity^ the neces- 
sity of so thinking, as the criterion of our non-experiential 
notions and judgments. Afterwards Kant, in his Critic of 
Pure Reason, developed and applied this criterion. And it 
may now be considered as the acknowledged test of our unac- 
quired cognitions amongst those who admit that there are non- 
experiential notions and judgments. Now, it is in relation to 
this fundamental distinction, that Sir William Hamilton has 
developed the philosophy of the conditioned. He admits that 
we have non-experiential notions and judgments, (we prefer to 
call the two classes of notions and judgments, primary and 
secondary^ as we think both classes, from a certain point of 
view, can appropriately be considered as experiential in 9> 
restricted sense,) and he concurs with Leibnitz and Kant, that 
necessity is their distinctive quality. But then, he maintains, 
that the doctrine, as developed by all previous philosophers, is 
one-sided, when it should be two-sided. And the side of the 
doctrine, which philosophers have overlooked, is the important 
one. The doctrine, as heretofore enounced and recognized, is 
that the necessity is a positive one, so to think, and is deter- 
mined by a mental power. But Sir William Hamilton consid- 
ers, and very justly, that this is only half of the truth, and the 
least important half; because this necessity is never illusive, 
never constrains to error; while the necessity which he indicates 
is naturally illusive. His doctrine is, that this necessity is both 
positive and negative: "The one, the necessity of so thinking 
(the impossibility of not so thinking,) determined by a mental 
power, the other the necessity of not so thinking (the impossibili- 
ty of so thinking,) determined by a mental impotence." This 
negative necessity, which has been overlooked by philosophers, 



24 

plajs an important part on the theatre of thinking. It is to 
the development of its function in our mental economy, that 
the philosophy of the conditioned is directed. As philosophy 
stood, the very highest law of intelligence, which asserts that 
of two contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be true, led 
continually to the most pervasive and fundamental errors. 
Because when one alternative was found incogitable, the mind 
immediately recoiled to the conclusion that the other contradic- 
tory must be true. When, for example, in examining the doc^ 
trine of the will, it was discovered that the freedom of the will 
was incomprehensible, could not be speculatively construed to 
the mind, the inquirer immediately recoiled to the alternative, 
of the nesessity of human actions; and so on the other hand, 
when the necessity of the will was found incogitable, the inqui- 
rer fell back upon the alternative of liberty. So that philoso- 
phers, like Milton's fallen angels, had 

« reason'd high 

Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate, 
Fixt fate, freewill, foreknowledge absolute, 
And found no end, in wandering mazes lost." 

Thus the negative necessity, of not so tJiinJcing, which was 
not ever even suspected to exist, had been a source of constant 
errors utterly incapable of solution. But Sir William Hamil- 
ton has discovered, that we may be negatively unable to think 
one contradictory, and yet find ourselves equally impotent to 
conceive the opposite. To this fundamental psychological fact 
he has applied the highest law of intelligence, that of two con- 
tradictories, one must of necessity he true ; and that therefore, 
there is no ground for inferring a fact to be impossible, merely 
from our inability to conceive its possibility. And thus is dis- 
closed the hidden rock on which speculation, in its highest pro- 
blems, had foundered. 

The philosophy of the conditioned is the development and 
application of this Negative Necessity in combination with the 
Positive. In order to give precision to the doctrine of the con- 
ditioned, the conditions of the thinkable are evoked and 
systematized under the two fundamental categories of positive 
and negative thinking. And these categories are themselves 
subdivided in order to bring out their import in generic 



25 

instances of their application in practical thought. These con- 
ditions of the thinkable we have exhibited ; but it now becomes 
necessary to recur to them, for the needs of the discussion and 
exposition on which we now enter. 

The most important and comprehensive question in meta- 
physics is, The origin and nature of the causal judgment. No 
less than seven theories had been propounded on the problem ; 
and now, Sir William Hamilton has propounded an eighth, 
entirely new. He attempts to resolve the causal judgment 
into a modification of the law of the conditioned, which is so 
obtrusive in his view of philosophy. He makes the causal 
judgment a mere inability to think an absolute beginning : — a 
mere necessity to deny that the object, which we apprehend as 
beginning to be, really so begins: — an inability to construe it 
in thought, as possible, that the complement of existence has 
been increased or diminished : — a mere necessity to affirm the 
identity of its present sum of being, with the sum of its past 
existence. The supposed connection between cause and effect 
is, in its last analysis, resolved into a mental impotence, the 
result of the law of the conditioned. 

It is manifest, that in this theory, the fact of our inability 
to conceive the complement of existence, either increased or 
diminished, is the turning point in the question. That, because 
we are unable to construe it, in thought, that such increase or 
diminution is possible, we are constrained to refund the present 
sum of existence into the previous sum of existence, is given as 
an explanation of the causal judgment. 

Now, it seems to us, that this solution avoids the important 
element in the phenomenon to be explained. The question in 
nature, is not whether the present complement of existence had 
a previous existence — has just begun to be ? but, how comes 
its new appearance? The obtrusive and essential element, 
is the new appearance, the change. This is the fact which 
elicits the causal judgment. To the change is necessarily pre- 
fixed, by the understanding, a cause or potence. The cause is 
the correlative to the change, elicited in thought and posited in 
nature. The question as to the origin of the sum of existence, 
does in no way intrude into consciousness, and is not involved 
in the causal judgment. Such a question may, of course, be 
4 



26 

raised ; and then the theory of Sir William Hamilton is a 
true account of what would take place in the mind. And this 
is the question, which, it seems to us. Sir William has present- 
ed as the problem of the causal judgment. His statement of 
the problem is this: "When aware of a new appearance, we 
are unable to conceive that therein has originated any new 
existence, and are therefore constrained to think that what 
now appears to us under a new form, had previously an exist- 
ence under others — others conceivable by us or not. We are 
utterly unable to construe it in thought, as possible that the 
complement of existence has been increased or diminished." 

This seems to us, not a proper statement of the problem of 
causation. This problem does not require the complement of 
existence to be accounted for; but the neiv form to be account- 
ed for ; and a new form must not be confounded with an entire- 
ly neiu existence. Causation must be discriminated from 
creation ; in the first, change only, in the last, the complement 
of existence, is involved. If we attempt to solve the problem 
of creation, the notion of an absolute beginning is involved; 
consequently, a negative impotence is experienced, as we can- 
not think an absolute beginning, and we would fall back on the 
notion of causation — would stop short at the causal judgment, 
unable to rise to a higher cognition — the cognition of creation. 

The causal judgment consists in the necessity we are under 
of prefixing in thought a cause to every change, of which we 
think. Now change implies previous existence; else it is not 
change. Of what does it imply the previous existence? Of 
that which is changed, and also of that by which the change is 
efi"ected. Now change is efi'ect. It is the result of an opera- 
tion. Operation is cause (potence) realizing itself in efi'ect. 
It seems to us, by this somewhat tautological analysis, that 
cause and efi'ect necessarily imply each other, both in nature 
and in thought. Causality is thought both as a law of things 
and a law of intelligence. When we attempt to separate effect 
from cause, in our thought, contradiction emerges. It is re- 
alized to consciousness in every act of will, and in every act of 
positive thinking as both natural and rational. Cause and 
effect are related to each other, as terms in thought, as well as 
realities in existence. Causality is primarily natural, seconda- 



• 27 

rilj rational. The woof of reasoning, into "whicli its notion is 
woven, has the two threads of the material and the rational 
running together, by which existence and thought are harmo- 
nized into truth; the objective responding to the subjective. 
If this were not the law of material thinking, we do not see 
how there could be any consecutive thinking about nature. 
The notion of cause always leads thought in material reason- 
ing — always determines the mental conclusion, as the notion of 
reason does in formal or pure reasoning. The law of cause 
and effect is, in material thought, what the law of reason and 
consequent is in formal thought. 

It is doubtless true, that the negative impotence to think an 
absolute beginning necessarily connects in thought present 
with past existence ; and as all change must take place in some 
existence, the change itself is connected in thought with some- 
thing antecedent; and, therefore, the mind is necessitated by 
the negative impotence to predicate something antecedent to 
the change. But, then, as a mere negative impotence cannot 
yield an affirmative judgment, it cannot connect present with 
past existence, in the relation of cause and effect, but only in 
sum of existence which it is unable to think either increased or 
diminished. The causal judgment is determined by a mental 
power elicited into action by an observed change, and justified 
thereby as an affirmation of a potence evinced in the changed 
existence; and it matters not whether the change be the result 
of many concurring causes, or of one ; still the notion of po- 
tence cannot but be thought as involved in the phenomenon. 
When we see a tree shivered to atoms by a flash of lightning, 
it is difficult to be convinced, that the causal judgment elicited 
by the phenomenon, is merely the impotence to think an abso- 
lute beginning. 

We are conscious that we are the authors of our own actions; 
and this is, to be conscious of causation in ourselves. But if 
we attempt to analyze this fact in consciousness by considering 
it as made up of two elements related in time, we confuse our- 
selves by the impotence to conceive any causal nexus between 
the supposed antecedent and consequent. The fact is, that 
they are a simultaneous deliverance of consciousness realizing 
an antithesis in one inseparable act ; because cause and effect 



28 • 

are never realized separately, but conjointly. Efficiency is 
twofold, partly cause, partly effect, and cannot be thought 
otherwise without contradiction. Cause is thus thought as an 
indefinite, as not having either an absolute beginning or end- 
ing. Absolute beginning is not more necessary to the notion 
of cause than to that of time. Both are thought as quantities, 
and though both are thought as indeterminates, like all inde- 
terminates, are capable of a determinate application. And 
while realized as particular, they are thought as universal. 

We are prone to postulate principles more absolutely than 
they are warranted by nature. Therefore it is, that the sub- 
tleties of nature so often drop through the formulas of the 
logician ; and he retains in their stead abstractions not corres- 
ponding with existence. Excessive study of formal logic 
tends to lessen the capacity for appreciating the imports of 
intuition. The apodictic character of logical relations is so 
different from that of mere material relations, that a mind, 
long addicted to the estimation of the former, cannot but con- 
tract a fallacious bias somewhat like that of the mere analytical 
mathematician, but of course to a much less degree. And on 
the other hand, a metaphysician, who like Locke, is deficient 
in a knowledge of logic, and unpractised in its precise distinc- 
tions and forms, becomes loose, inconsequent, and contradic- 
tious in his opinions. We venture to suggest, that the former 
of these biases is apparent in the application of the law of the 
conditioned to the causal judgment, by Sir William Hamilton. 
He postulates it too unqualifiedly. 

The doctrine of the conditioned rescues thought from other- 
wise insoluble contradictions, by carrying up the contradictory 
phenomena into a common principle of limitation of our facul- 
ties. For example : If we attempt to think an absolute begin- 
ning, we find it impossible; and on the other hand, if we 
attempt to think its contradictory opposite, an infinite non- 
beginning, we find it equally incogitable. If therefore, both 
be received as positive affirmative deliverances of our intelli- 
gence, then our minds testify, by necessity, to lies. But the 
philosophy of the conditioned emphatically forbids us to con- 
found, as equivalent, non-existence with incogitability ; because 
it docs not make the human mind the measure of existence. 



29 

but just the reverse. It postulates as its fundamental prin- 
ciple, that the incogitable may and must be necessarily true 
upon the acknowledged highest principle of intelligence, that 
of two contradictories one must, but both cannot be true. 
Thus by carrying up these contradictions into the common 
principle of a limitation of our faculties, intelligence is shown 
to be feeble, but not false ; and the contradictory phenomena 
are rescued from contradiction, by showing that one must be 
true. And by this doctrine, the moral responsibility of man 
is vindicated from all cavil. Thus while the liberty of the 
will is inconceivable, so is its contradictory opposite, the 
necessity of human actions. As then, these two negations are 
at equipoise, and can neither prove nor disprove anything, the 
testimony of consciousness, that we are, though we know not 
how, the real and responsible authors of our actions, gives the 
affirmance to our accountability. And out of this moral germ 
springs the root of the argument for the existence of God, 
•which combined with the lately too much disparaged argument 
from design, constitutes a valid basis for the doctrine of natural 
Theology. Thus are vindicated, by this new development of 
the philosophy of common sense, the great truths of our 
practical reason, as they have been called; and speculation 
and practice are reconciled. And the doctrine that God is 
incognizable is demonstrated ; and that it is only through the 
analogy of the human with the divine nature, that we are 
percipient of the existence of God. Power and knowledge, 
and virtue cognized in ourselves, and tending to consummation, 
reveal the notion of God. For unless all analogy be rejected, 
the mind must believe in that first cause, which by the limited 
nature of our faculties we cannot know. In the language 
of the great Puritan divine, John Owen: "All the rational 
conceptions of the minds of men are swallowed up and lost, 
when they would exercise themselves directly on that which is 
absolutely immense, eternal, infinite. When we say it is so, 
we know not what we say, but only that it is not otherwise. 
What we deny of God we know in some measure — but what 
we affirm we know not; only we declare what we believe and 
adore." 

While therefore, this philosophy confines our knowledge to 



30 

the conditioned, it leaves faith free about the unconditioned; 
indeed constrains us to believe in it, by the highest law of our 
intelligence. This fundamental truth of his philosophy Sir 
William Hamilton has enounced in this comprehensive canon : 
"Thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between 
two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of 
which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the prin- 
ciple of Excluded Middle, the one or the other is necessarily 
true." As therefore the unconditioned, as we have seen, 
presents itself to the human mind, under a plural form of con- 
tradictory opposites, as either the absolute or the infinite, the 
problem comes under this canon, and the unconditianed is 
established as a verity, incognizable but heUevahle. Thus, in 
the very fact of the limitation of our knowledge, is discovered 
the affirmation, by the highest law of our intelligence, of the 
transcendent nature of faithi There is no philosophy, which 
in its spirit, its scope, and its doctrines, both positive and 
negative, so conciliates and upholds revealed religion, as that 
which is based on this great canon of Metaphysics. The 
conditions on which revelation with its complement of doc- 
trines, is offered to our belief, are precisely those whichi this 
canon enounces. 

Having exhibited an outline of what Sir William Hamilton 
has done for Metaphysics, we will now proceed to show what he 
has done for Logic. 

In what we have said about the relation, which the philoso- 
phy of Sir William Hamilton bears to that of Bacon, we, by no 
means, intend to affirm, that there is much intellectual sympa- 
thy between the two great thinkers. It is quite otherwise. 
Bacon was preeminently objective, exhausting his great powers 
chiefly in the field of physics, because, in his time, there lay 
the needs of truth; while Hamilton, rather turning his back on 
physics, because of their now extravagant cultivation, is supreme- 
ly subjective, throwing his vast energies upon inquiries in the 
province of intellectual philosophy. And though Sir William 
Hamilton does not directly disparage the labours of Bacon, yet 
he vaunts those of Des Cartes at their expense, and certainly 
nowhere does those of Bacon justice. But still the philosophies 
of Bacon and of Hamilton are concordant developments of the 



31 

one philosophy of common sense, and are affiliated in unity of 
fundamental doctrine. Bacon is the forerunner, in that great 
intellectual movement, to which Hamilton has communicated 
such a mighty energy of thought, contributed the light of such 
vast erudition, and adduced such stringent historical proofs of 
its perennial existence. It is the inductive branch of Logic with 
its kindred doctrines, which Sir William Hamilton has brought 
out into bold relief, from the subordination in which it was held 
by Aristotle : while, at the same time, he has so developed, and 
simplified by a completer analysis, the deductive branch, that 
the Stagirite only retains his superior fame by being the precur- 
sor. And it is, by his successful labours upon these two great 
branches of Logic, that Sir William Hamilton conciliates 
the philosophies of Aristotle and Bacon; and gives to modern 
thought a force of reasoning, through the practical application 
of nicer discriminations of the forms of thought, and more ade- 
quate logical expression, which elevates this century to a higher 
intellectual platform. All this shall sufficiently appear in the 
Sequel. 

When in the year 1833, Sir William Hamilton published in 
the Edinburgh Beview, his criticism on Whately's Logic, there 
was prevalent in Britain, total ignorance of the higher logical 
philosophy. The treatise of Whately was the highest logical 
standard; which, though in ability it is much above mediocrity, 
in erudition is far below the literature of the subject. The 
article of Sir William elevated the views of British logicians 
above the level of Whately, and gave them glimpses of a higher 
doctrine. But the chief service rendered by this masterly criti- 
cism, was the precision with which it defined the nature and 
the object matter of logic, and discriminated the whole subject 
doctrinally and historically, in the concentrated light of its 
literature. 

The treatise of Whately presents indistinct, ambiguous and 
even contradictory views of the proper object matter of logic. 
Sometimes it makes the process or operation of reasoning, the 
total matter about which logic is conversant; at other times, it 
makes logic entirely conversant about language. Now, though 
it involves a manifest contradiction to say, that logic is exclu- 
sively conversant about each of two opposite things, yet Whately 



32 

was praised by British logicians for the clearness with which he 
displayed the true nature and office of logic. In the low state 
of logical knowledge in Britain, which these facts indicate, it 
behoved whoever undertook to point out Whately's blunders 
to enter into the most elementary discussion of logic both name 
and thing. This Sir William Hamilton did in the article now 
under consideration. 

Aristotle designated logic by no single term. He employed 
different terms to designate particular parts or applications of 
logic; as is shown by the names of his several treatises. In 
fact, Aristotle did not look at logic from any central point of 
view. And, indeed, his treatises are so overladen' with extra- 
logical matter, as to show that the true theoretical view of 
logic as an independent science had not disclosed itself to its 
great founder. In fact, it has only been gradually, that the 
proper view of the science has been speculatively adopted — 
practically it never has been ; and no contribution to the litera- 
ture of the subject has done so much to discriminate the true 
domain of logic, as this article of Sir William Hamilton. It 
marks an era in the science. Mounting up to the father of 
logic himself, it showed that nineteen twentieths of his logical 
treatises, treat of matters that transcend logic considered as a 
formal science. It is shown that the whole doctrine of the mo- 
dality of syllogisms does not belong to logic; for if any mat- 
ter, be it demonstrative or probable, be admitted into logic, 
none can be excluded. And thus, with the consideration of 
the real truth or falsehood of propositions, the whole body of 
real science must come within the domain of logic, oblite- 
rating all distinction between formal and real inference. 

The doctrine maintained in this article is, that logic is con- 
versant about the laws of thought considered merely as thought. 
The import of this doctrine we will now attempt to unfold. 
The term thought is used in several significations of very differ- 
ent extent. It is sometimes used to designate every mental 
modification of which we are conscious, including will, feeling, 
desire. It is sometimes used in the more limited sense of every 
cognitive fact, excluding will, feeling, desire. In its most 
limited meaning, it denotes only the acts of the understanding 
or faculty of comparison or relation, called also the discursive 



33 

or elaborative faculty. It is in this most restricted sense that 
the word thought is used in relation to logic. Logic supposes 
the materials of thought already in the mind, and only con- 
siders the manner of their elaboration. And the operation of 
the elaborative faculty on these materials is what is meant by 
thought proper. And it is the laws of thought, in this, its re- 
stricted sense, about which logic is conversant. 

It must be further discriminated, that logic is conversant 
about thought as a product, and not about the producing ope- 
ration or process; this belongs to psychology. Logic, there- 
fore, in treating of the laws of thought, treats of them in re- 
gard to thought considered as a product. What, then, is 
thought ? In other words, what are the acts of the elaborative 
faculty? They are three, conception, judgment, reasoning. 
These are all acts of comparison — gradations of thought. Of 
these, as producing acts, psychology treats. Logic treats of 
the products of these, called respectively, a concept, a judg- 
ment, a reasoning. The most articulate enunciation, therefore, 
of the intrinsic nature of logic is, the science of the formal laws 
of thought considered as a product, and not as a process. 

But we will show still further what a form of thought is. In 
an act of thinking there are three things, which we can discri- 
minate in consciousness. First, there is a thinking subject ; 
second, an object which we think, called the matter of thought; 
and third, the relation subsisting between the subject and 
object of which we are conscious — a relation always manifested 
in some mode or manner. This last is the form of thought. 
Now logic takes account only of this last — the form of thought. 
In so far as the form of thought is viewed in relation to the 
subject, as an act, operation, or energy, it belongs to psycho- 
logy. It is only in reference to what is thought about, only 
considered as a product, that the form of the act, or operation, 
or energy, has relation to logic. 

With this explanation, we will now enounce the laws of 
thought, of which logic is the science. 

In treating of the conditions of the thinkable, as systema- 
tized by Sir William Hamilton, we have pointed out the fact, 
that it is shown, that logic springs out of the condition of non- 
contradiction; for that this condition is brought to bear only 
5 



34 

under three phases constituting three laws: 1st, the law of 
Identity; 2d, the law of Contradiction; 3d, the law ^^ Excluded 
Middle: of which laws logic is the science. Of these laws we 
will treat in their order, and explicate the import or logical 
significance of each. 

The principle of Identity expresses the relation of total same- 
ness, in which, a product of the thinking faculty, be it concept, 
judgment, or reasoning, stands to all, and the relation of par- 
tial sameness, in which it stands to each, of its constituent 
characters. This principle is the special application of the 
absolute equivalence of the whole and its parts taken together, 
applied to the thinking of a thing, by the attribution of its con- 
stituent or distinctive characters. In the predicate, the whole 
is contained explicitly, and in the subject implicitly. The logi- 
cal significance of the law lies in this — that it is the principle 
of all logical affirmation — of all logical definition. 

The second law, that of Contradiction^ is this: What is con- 
tradictory is unthinkable. Its principle may be thus expressed: 
When a concept is determined by the attribution or affirmation 
of a certain character, mark, note, or quality, the concept can- 
not be thought to be the same when such character is denied of 
it. Assertions are mutually contradictory, when the one 
affirms that a thing possesses, or is determined by, the charac- 
ters which the other affirms it does not possess or is not deter- 
mined by. The logical significance of this law consists in its 
being the principle of all logical negation, or distinction. 

The laws of Identity and Contradiction are co-ordinate and 
reciprocally relative: and neither can be deduced from the 
other; for each supposes the other. 

The third law, called the principle of Excluded Middle, em- 
braces that condition of thought which compels us, of two con- 
tradictory notions (which cannot both exist by the law of con- 
tradiction) to think either the one or the other as existing. By 
the laws of Identity and Contradiction, we are warranted to 
conclude from the truth of one contradictory to the falsehood 
of the other ; and by the law of Excluded Middle, we are war- 
ranted to conclude from the falsehood of one, to the truth of 
the other. The logical significance of this law consists in this 
— that it determines that, of two forms given in the laws of 



35 

Identity and Contradiction^ and by these laws affirmed as those 
exclusively possible, that of these two only possible forms, the 
one or the other must be affirmed, as necessary, of every object. 
This law is the principle of disjunctive judgments, which stand 
in such mutual relation, that the affirmation of the one is the 
denial of the other. 

These three laws stand to each other in relation like the 
three sides of a triangle. They are not the same, not reduci- 
ble to unity, yet each giving, in its own existence, that of the 
other. They form one principle in different aspects. 

These laws are but phases of that condition of the thinkable 
which stipulates for the absolute absence of non-contradiction. 
Whatever, therefore, violates these laws is impossible not only 
in thought but in existence ; and they thus determine, for us, 
the sphere of possibility and impossibility, not merely in thought 
but in reality. They are therefore not wholly logical but also 
metaphysical. To deny the universal application of these laws is 
to subvert the reality of thought; and as the subversion would 
be an act of thought, it annihilates itself. They are therefore 
insuperable. 

There is a fourth law which is a corollary of these three 
primary laws, called the law of Reason and Consequent, which 
is so obtrusive in our reasoning that it needs to be specially 
considered. The logical significance of this law lies in this, 
that in virtue of it, thought is constituted into a series of acts 
indissolubly connected, each necessarily inferring the other. 
The mind is necessitated to this or that determinate act of 
thinking, by a knowledge of something different from the think- 
ing process itself. That which determines the mind is called 
the reason, that to which the mind is determined is called the 
consequent, and the relation between the two is called the con- 
sequence. By reason of our intelligent nature, there is a 
necessary dependence of one notion upon another, from which 
all logical inference results as an inevitable consequent. This 
inference is of two kinds. It must proceed, from the whole to 
the parts, or from the parts to the whole. When the determi- 
ning notion (the reason) is conceived as a whole containing 
(under it) and therefore necessitating the determined notion 
(the consequent) conceived as its contained part or partSy argu- 



36 

mentation proceeds, by mental analysis, from the wliole to the 
parts into which it is separated. When the determining notion 
is conceived as the 'parts constituting^ and therefore necessita- 
ting the determined notion conceived as the constituted whole, 
argumentation proceeds, by mental synthesis, from the parts. to 
the whole. The process from the whole to the parts is called 
deductive reasoning ; the other process, from the parts to the 
whole, is called inductive reasoning. There is therefore in 
logic a deductive syllogism and an inductive syllogism. The 
former is governed by the rule: — what belongs {or does not 
belong) to the containing whole, belongs {or does not belong) to 
each and all of the contained parts. The latter by the rule : — 
What belongs {or does not belong) to all the constituent par^ts, 
belongs {or does not belong) to the constituted whole. These 
rules exclusively determine all formal inference; whatever tran- 
scends or violates them, transcends or violates logic. 

Sir William Hamilton was the first to discriminate accu- 
rately the difference between the deductive and the inductive 
syllogism. All that had been said by logicians, except Aris- 
totle, and he is brief, and by no means unambiguous, on logical 
induction, is entirely erroneous ; for they all, including Whately, 
confound logical or formal induction, with that which is philo- 
sophical, and material, and extralogical. They consider logi- 
cal induction not as governed by the necessary laws of thought, 
but as determined by the probabilities of the sciences from 
which the matter is borrowed. All inductive reasoning logical 
and material proceeds from the parts (singulars) to the whole 
(universal:) but in the formal or subjective, the illation is dif- 
ferent from that in the material or objective. In the former, 
the illation is founded on the necessary laws of thought ; in the 
latter, on the general or particular analogies of nature. The 
logician knows no principle, but the necessary laws of thought. 
His conclusions are necessitated, not presumed. 

All this confusion was produced by the introduction, into 
formal logic, of various kinds of matter. Aristotle himself, 
corrupted logic in this way ; and Sir William Hamilton has 
been the first to expel entirely this foreign element, and to 
purify logic from the resulting errors, though Kant had done 
much towards the same result. When we reflect, that the only 



37 

legitimate illation in formal logic, is that regulated by the law 
of reason and consequent, which connects thought into a recip- 
rocally dependent series, each necessarily inferring the other, 
it is, at once, manifest, that the distinction of matter into pos- 
sible, actual, and necessary, is a doctrine wholly extralogical. 
Logical illation never differs in degree — never falls below that 
of absolute, necessity. The necessary laws of thought con- 
straining an inevitable illation, are the only principle known to 
the logician. 

We have just seen that Sir William Hamilton is the first to 
signalize the fact, that reasoning from the parts to the whole, 
is just as necessary, and exclusive of material considerations, 
as reasoning from the whole to the parts. And he has evolved 
the laws of the Inductive Syllogism, and correlated them with 
those of the Deductive Syllogism. 

We now proceed to another important addition which he has 
made to logic. He has shown that there are two logical wholes, 
instead of one, as the logicians had supposed. These two 
wholes are the whole of Comprehension, called by Sir William, 
Depth, and the whole of Extension, called by him, Breadth. 
These two wholes are in an inverse ratio of each other. The 
maximum of depth and the minimum of breadth are found in 
the concept of an individual (which in reality is not a concept, 
but only a single representation;) while the minimum of breadth, 
and the maximum of depth is found in a simple concept — the 
concept of being or existence. Now, the depth of notions affords 
one of two branches of reasoning, which, though overlooked by 
logicians, is, at least, equally important as that afforded by 
their breadth, which alone has been developed by the logicians. 
The character of the former is that the predicate is contained 
in the subject; of the latter, that the subject is contained under 
the predicate. All reasoning, therefore, is either from the 
whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole, in breadth ; 
or from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole, 
in depth. The quantity of breadth is the creation of the mind, 
the quantity of depth is at once given in the very nature of 
things. The former therefore is factitious, the latter is natu- 
ral. The same proposition forms a different premise in these 



38 

different quantities, they being inverse ratios; the Sumption 
in Breadth being the Subsumption in Depth. 

Another fundamental development of logic, made by Sir Wil- 
liam, is that the Categorical Syllogism though mentally one 
(for all mediate inference is one and that categorical,) is either 
Analytic or Synthetic, from the necessity of adopting the one 
order or the other, in compliance with that condition of language 
which requires that a reasoning be distinguished into parts and 
detailed in order of sequence. Because explication is some- 
times better attained by an analytic and sometimes by a syn- 
thetic enouncement; as is shown in common language. The 
Aristotelic syllogism is exclusively synthetic. Sir William 
Hamilton thus relieves the syllogism from a one-sided view; 
and also rescues it from the objection of Petitio Principii or 
of an idle tautology, which has been so often urged against it. 
Such objection does not hold against the analytic syllogism, 
in which the conclusion is expressed first, and the premises are 
then stated as its reasons. And this form of reasoning being 
shown to be valid, the objection of Petitio Principii is, at once, 
turned off as applicable only to the accident of the external 
expression, and not to the essence of the internal thought. 
The analytic syllogism is not only the more natural, but is pre- 
supposed by the synthetic. It is more natural to express a 
reasoning in this direct and simple way, than in the round-about 
synthetic way. 

We will next consider the most important doctrine, perhaps, 
which Sir AVilliam Hamilton has discovered in the domain of 
logic. Logicians had admitted that the subject of a proposition 
has a determinate quantity in thought, and this was, accordingly, 
expressed in language. But logicians had denied, that the pre- 
dicate in propositions has a determinate quantity. Sir William 
Hamilton has, therefore, the honour to have first disclosed the 
principle of the thorough-going quantification of the predicate, 
in its full significance, in both affirmative and negative propo- 
sitions. By keeping constantly in view, that logic is conversant 
about the internal thought and not the external expression, he 
has detected more, of what it is common to omit in expression, 
of that which is efiicient in thought, than any other philoso- 
pher. Inferences, judgments, problems, are often occult in the 



39 

thought, which are omitted in the expression. The purpose of 
common language is merely to exhibit with clearness the mat- 
ter of thought. This is often accomplished best, by omitting 
the expression of steps in the mental process of thinking ; as 
the minds of others will intuitively supply the omitted steps, 
as they follow the meaning of the elliptical expression. This 
elliptical character of common language has made logicians 
overlook the quantification of the predicate. The purpose of 
common language does not require the quantity to be expressed. 
Therefore, it was supposed, that there is no quantification in 
the internal thought. When we reflect that all thought is a 
comparison of less and more, of part and whole, it is marvellous 
that it should not have been sooner discovered that all thought 
must be under some determinate quantity. And, as all predi- 
cation is but the expression of the internal thought, predication 
must have a determinate quantity — the quantity of the internal 
thought. But such has been the iron rule of Aristotle, that, 
in two thousand years. Sir William Hamilton has been the first 
logician, who, while appreciating the labours of the Stagirite in 
this paramount branch of philosophy, has been, in no degree, 
enslaved by his authority, and has made improvements in, and 
additions to, logic, which almost rival those of the great founder 
of the science himself. 

The ofiice of logic is to exhibit, with exactness, the form of 
thought, and therefore to supply, in expression, the omissions 
of common language, whose purpose is merely to exhibit, with 
clearness, the matter of thought. Logic claims, therefore, as its 
fundamental postulate. That we he alloived to state, in language, 
what is contained in thought. This is exemplified in the syllo- 
gism, which is a logical statement of the form of thought in 
reasoning, supplying in expression, what has been omitted in 
common language. Apply this rule to propositions; and it is 
at once discovered, that the predicate is always of a given quan- 
tity in relation to the subject. 

Upon the principle of the quantification of the predicate, Sir 
William Hamilton has founded an entirely new analytic of 
logical forms. The whole system of logic has been remodelled 
and simplified. The quantification of the predicate reveals, 
that the relation between the terms of a proposition is one not 



40 

only of similarity, but of identity; and there being conse- 
quently an equation of subject and predicate, these terms are 
always necessarily convertible. So that simple conversion 
takes the place of the complex and erroneous doctrine, with its 
load of rules, heretofore taught by logicians. 

By the new analytic, Sir William Hamilton has also ampli- 
fied logic. The narrower views of logicians, in accordance 
with which an unnatural art had been built up, have been su- 
perseded by a wider view commensurate with nature. Logic 
should exhibit all the forms of thought, and not merely an 
arbitrary selection; and especially where they are proclaimed 
as all. The rules of the logicians ignore many forms of affir- 
mation and negation, which the exigencies of thinking require, 
and are constantly used, but have not been noted in their ab- 
stract generality. Accordingly, Sir William Hamilton has 
shown that there are eight necessary relations of prepositional 
terms; and, consequently, eight prepositional forms performing 
peculiar functions in our reasonings, which are implicitly at work 
in our concrete thinking; and not four only, as has been gene- 
rally taught. Logic has been rescued from the tedious minute- 
ness of Aristotle, and his one sided view, and from the trammels 
of technicality, and restored to the amplitude and freedom of 
the laws of thought. 

The analysis of Sir William Hamilton enables us also to dis- 
criminate the class, and to note the differential quality of each 
of those syllogisms, whose forms are dependent on the internal 
essence of thought, and not on the contingent order of external 
expression, such as the disjunctive, hypothetical, and dilem- 
matic syllogism, and to show the special fundamental law of 
thought by which each distinctive reasoning is more particu- 
larly regulated. And those forms of syllogism, which are de- 
pendent on the contingent order of the external expression 
embraced in the three figures of Aristotle, are expounded anew; 
and while their legitimacy is vindicated, the fourth figure, 
which has been engrafted on the system by some alien hand, is 
shown to be a mere logical caprice. But we cannot particu- 
larize further. In fact, the workshop of the understanding has 
been laid open, and the materials, the moulds, and the castings 
of thought, in all their variety of pattern have been exhibited, 



41 

and the great mystery of thinking revealed by this great mas- 
ter, on whom the mantle of Aristotle has fallen in the nine- 
teenth centurv. 

Logic may be discriminated into two grand divisions — the 
Doctrine of Elements, and the Doctrine of Method. Thought 
can only be exerted under the general laws of Identity, Con- 
tradiction, and Excluded Middle, and Reason and Consequent; 
and through the general forms of concepts, judgments, and 
reasonings. These, therefore, in their abstract generality, are 
the elements of thought ; and that part of logic, which treats 
of them, is the Doctrine of Elements. To this part of logic, 
we have thus far confined our remarks. And the writings of 
Sir William Hamilton treat only of this part of logic. But, in 
order to show the historical position of Sir William, and to 
exhibit the relation, which, we have said his philosophy bears to 
the philosophy of Aristotle and the philosophy of Bacon, as an 
initial, or step of progress towards harmonizing the logic of 
the one with the Method of the other, it becomes necessary to 
remark briefly upon the second part of Logic, the Doctrine of 
Method. 

Method is a regular procedure, governed by rules which 
guide us to a definite end, and guard us against aberrations. 
The end of Method is logical perfection, which consists in the 
perspicuit3^ the completeness, and the harmony of our know- 
ledge. As we have shown, our knowledge supposes two condi- 
tions, one of which has relation to the thinking subject, and 
supposes that what is known, is known clearly, distinctly, com- 
pletely., and in connection ; the second has relation to what is 
known, and supposes that what is known, has a veritable or 
real existence. The former constitutes the logical, or formal 
perfection of knowledge ; the latter, the scientific, or material 
perfection of knowledge. Logic, as we have shown, is conver- 
sant about the form of thought only ; it is, therefore, confined 
exclusively to the formal perfection of our knowledge, and has 
nothing to do with its scientific, or material truth, or perfection. 
Method, therefore, consists of such rules as guide to logical per- 
fection. These rules are, definition, division, and concatena- 
tion, or probation. The doctrine of these rules is Method. 

Logic, as a system of rules, is only valuable, as a mean, to- 
6 



42 

"wards logic as a habit of the mind — a speculative knowledge 
of its doctrines, and a practical dexterity with which thej may 
be applied. Logic, therefore, both in the doctrine of elements 
and the doctrine of method, is discriminated into abstract or 
pure, and into concrete or applied. We have thus far, only 
had reference to abstract or pure logic; and Sir William Ham- 
ilton treats only of this. It becomes, however, necessary for 
our purpose, to pass into concrete or applied logic. Now, as 
the end of abstract, or pure logical method is merely the logical 
perfection of our knowledge, having reference only to the think- 
ing subject ; the end of concrete or applied logical method, is 
real or material truth, having reference only to the real exist- 
ence of what is thought about. Concrete logic is, therefore, 
conversant about the laws of thought, as modified by the em- 
pirical circumstances, internal and external, in which man 
thinks; and, also, about the laws under which the objects of 
existence are to be known. We beg our readers to remember 
these distinctions, and that all that now follows is about con- 
crete or applied logic. 

In order to show how the improvements and developments 
in formal logic, which we have exhibited, that have been made 
by Sir William Hamilton, conciliate the deductive, or explica- 
tive logic of Aristotle, with the inductive or ampliative logic of 
Bacon, it becomes necessary to state the difference of the phi- 
losophical methods of the two philosophers. 

The great difficulty, with the ancient philosophers of the 
Socratic School, was to correlate logically, the a 'priori and the 
a posteriori elements of our knowledge. The difficulty seems 
to have been suggested by the question, How can ive know a 
thing for the first time f This question raised the doubt, that 
it is vain to search after a thing which we know not, since not 
knowing the object of our search, we should be ignorant of it 
•when found, for we cannot recognize what we do not know. 
Plato, and Socrates perhaps, solved the difficulty by the doc- 
trine, that to discover, or to learn, is but to remember what 
has been known by us in a prior state of existence. Investiga- 
tion was thus vindicated as a valid process ; and also a useful 
one, as it is important to recall to memory what has been for- 
gotten. Upon this theory of knowledge, Plato made intellect, 



43 

to the exclusion of sense, the faculty of scientific knowledge, 
and ideas or universals the sole objects of philosophical investi- 
gation. The Platonic philosophy, called, in this aspect of it, 
Dialectic, had for its object of investigation, the true nature of 
that connection which exists between each thing and the arche- 
typ'al form or idea which makes it what it is, and to awaken 
the soul to a. full remembrance of what had been known prior 
to being imprisoned in the body. 

Aristotle made a great advance beyond Plato, towards corre- 
lating the a 'priori and a posteriori elements of our knowledge. 
He rejected the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, as universals exist- 
ing anterior to and separate from singulars ; and thereby 
ignored the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. Still, he did 
not extricate himself out of the difficulties which environed the 
problem of human knowledge. He seems to have believed in 
the existence of universals or forms, not apart from, but in, 
particulars or singulars. And to correspond with this meta- 
physical doctrine, he made both intellect and sense important 
faculties in science. He maintained an a priori knowledge 
paramount to, but not exclusive of, the a iJosteriorL That 
while universals are known through the intellect, and implicitly 
contain particulars or singulars, yet we may be ignorant of 
the singulars or particulars, until realized in and through sense; 
and that, therefore, though all knowing is through previous 
knowledge, yet the investigation of particulars is not superflu- 
ous ; because, while we may know the universal, we may be 
ignorant of the particular. Therefore, intellect and sense com- 
bine in framing the fabric of our knowledge. 

The Aristotelic method of investigation is, therefore, twofold, 
Deductive and Inductive ; the first allied with intellect and 
with universals, the latter allied with sense and with particu- 
lars. Aristotle, in accordance with this doctrine of method, 
seems to have considered syllogism proper, or deduction, no 
less ampliative than induction — that deductive inference did, in 
some way, assure us, or fortify our assurance of real truth. 
We greatly doubt whether he discriminated at all, the difi'erence 
between formal and material inference ; we think that he rather 
referred all difference in the cogency of inference, to the dif- 
ference of necessity or contingency in the matter. He, 



44 

strangely enough, maintains for the syllogism proper, the 
power to deduce true conclusions from false premises. There- 
fore, the syllogistic inference is not wholly dependent on the 
premises. And consequently, Deduction is not dependent on 
Induction, whose office it is to supply the premises. 

This logical doctrine of Aristotle corresponds with his meta- 
physical, and his psychological doctrine. As he makes univer- 
sals the paramount object of science, and intellect its para- 
mount principle, so does he make syllogism the paramount 
process, and induction the inferior process in logic ; for though 
intellect is not with him as with Plato, the sole principle of 
science, but conjunct with sense, yet sense is logically subordi- 
nate to intellect. There are, according to his theory of know- 
ledge, certain universal principles of knowledge existing in the 
mind, rather as native generalities than as mere necessities of 
so thinking, which furnish the propositions for syllogism; 
therefore syllogism is not dependent for these on induction. 
It is nevertheless true, that according to the Aristotelic theory, 
there is perfect harmony between intellect and sense, between 
syllogism and induction. And though syllogism is the more 
intellectual, the more scientific ; yet induction can be legiti- 
mately used as corroborative and complemental of syllogism, 
and particularly by weak minds, who can discern the universal 
in the particulars, but cannot apprehend it a priori as a native 
generality. It was because of this theory of knowledge, that 
induction holds so subordinate and inferior a place in the Aris- 
totelic logic. 

Whether our account of Aristotle's theory of knowledge be 
the true one or not, for there is much obscurity over his doc- 
trine, it is nevertheless certain, that Aristotle had a very im- 
perfect insight into induction as an objective process of investi- 
gation. And the slighting manner, in which he passes induction 
over, shows how little he appreciated it. He has made a crude 
and superficial distinction, which has been perpetuated to this 
day, between the universals derived from induction, and uni- 
versals derived from similars. In other words, he has corre- 
lated induction and analogy as difi'erent kinds of reasoning. 
And all writers on logic, including, we suspect, even Sir Wil- 
liam Hamilton, still speak of reasoning by induction, and rea- 



45 

soning by analogy. This, it seems to us, is a great confusion 
and error. We make induction the process, and analogy or 
similarity the evidence by which the illation is warranted. 
That analogy, which is the mere resemblance of relations, has 
nothing to do with philosophy ; but only that analogy, which 
consists of an essential resemblance or similarity. The ten- 
dency to generalize our knowledge, by the judgment, that where 
partial resemblance is found, total resemblance will be found, 
is an original principle of our intelligence, and may be called, 
the principle of philosophical presumption. Upon this prin- 
ciple the objective process of induction is founded, by which 
we conclude from something observed, to something not ob- 
served; from something within the sphere of experience, to 
something without its sphere. This principle of philosophical 
presumption, is brought to bear under two objective laws : 
the first proclaims. One in many, therefore one in all; the 
second proclaims. Many in one, therefore all in one. Through 
the first law, we conclude from a certain attribute being pos- 
sessed by many similar things or things of the same class, that 
the same attribute is possessed by all similar things or things 
of the same class. Through the second law, we conclude from 
the partial similarity of two or more things in some respects, to 
their complete or total similarity. Both laws conclude to unity 
in totality; by the first, from the recognized unity in plurality; 
by the second, from the recognized plurality in unity. Both 
of the laws, it is very apparent, are phases of the principle of 
resemblance or analogy. To call the first of these laws induc- 
tion, and the second, analogy, as has been done, destroys the 
correspondence between abstract or pure, and concrete or ap- 
plied logic. In abstract or pure logic, induction is recognized, 
but analogy not; therefore analogy cannot rest on the same 
basis with induction in concrete or applied logic, else, like in- 
duction, it would have its counterpart in abstract logic. 

The theory of knowledge, which we have expounded as his, 
in which the a 'priori element is so paramount to the a poste- 
riori, prevented Aristotle from having any but the shallowest 
insight into the scope of induction. The inevitable result of 
this was to make him slight observation through sense; and to 
rely chiefly on deduction from principles supplied by the intel- 



46 

lect. This was the cardinal vice of Plato, and also of Aristotle, 
but not nearly to so great an extent. The philosophy, there- 
fore, of Aristotle, is rather the result of an analysis of the con- 
tents of language, than a product of an original observation of 
nature. The philosophy of Bacon is just the reverse — it is a 
product of the observation of nature, and not an analysis of the 
contents of language. One of the chief precautions of the 
Novum Organum is, that language is but the registry of the crude 
notions of imperfect observation, and consequently that nature 
herself must be interpreted, to ascertain the truth. The logic 
of Aristotle was designed more for evolving, sifting, and 
methodizing what had already been thought, than for conduct- 
ing new investigations. The great purpose of Bacon was to 
bring philosophy from ^ooks and tradition to nature, from 
words to things, from the Syllogism to Induction. 

The true excellence of the Aristotelic logic, therefore, consists 
in its being considered formal and not material. In this view, 
the Organon of Aristotle is^ conversant about the laws under 
which the subject thinks; while the Novum Organum of Bacon 
is conversant about the laws under which the object is to be 
known. Viewed in this aspect, the two logics, though contra- 
riant, are not antagonistic; but are the complements of each 
other. The Aristotelic without the Baconian is null ; the Ba- 
conian without the Aristotelic is deficient. The Baconian 
supplies the material of the Aristotelic; and while the truth of 
science is wholly dependent on the Baconian, its logical perfec- 
tion is wholly dependent on the Aristotelic. The transition, in 
thinking, from the Baconian to the Aristotelic is as follows. 
The process of Induction, as founded on probability, is relative, 
but its conclusion is absolute. Similarities or analogies retain 
their character of difference and plurality in the inductive pro- 
cess, but become one and identical in the conclusion, or class, 
into which they are combined by an act of abstraction and 
generalization. This conclusion becomes the premise of De- 
duction. It is then within the domain of formal logic. 

That Sir William Hamilton has done much to reconcile the 
Aristotelic logic with the Baconian, by purifying the theory of 
both, and showing their interdependence, by developing that 
side of the Aristotelic which lies next to particulars and indue- 



4T 

tion, (for all his additions to logic are such,) must be admitted 
by those who can appreciate his writings. And nowhere, in 
the history of philosophy, is there a definition of Induction 
which reaches so thoroughly to the heart of the thing, the 
essential nature of the philosophical inference of the universal 
from the singular, as that which Sir William has given to dis- 
criminate the Baconian from the Aristotelic, the material from 
the formal. His definition is this : " A material illation of the 
universal from the singular, warranted either by the general 
analogies of nature, or by special presumptions afforded by the 
object matter of any real science." This definition shows 
that the inductive process of Bacon, is governed by the laws, 
not of the thinking subject, ratione formce, but by the laws of 
the object to be known, vi materiw. This definition, though 
only used to discriminate negatively the Aristotelic, or formal 
induction, sheds so much light on the Baconian induction, as to 
entitle Sir William Hamilton to the praise of having contributed 
to a true theoretic exposition of the Baconian method, by show- 
ing the ultimate basis of its validity, in disclosing the nature 
of the determining antecedent and the determined illation. 
The determining antecedent is shown to be the analogies of 
nature, which afi*ord presumptions varying in all degrees of 
probability, from the lowest to the highest certainty, that what 
is found in the singulars observed is in all the singulars. The 
physical observer asserts, on the analogy of his science, that 
as some horned animals ruminate, all horned animals ruminate. 
The logician accepts the conclusion, all horned animals rumi- 
nate, and brings it under the laws of thought, and considers 
the some of the physical observer as equivalent to his all. Sir 
William thus extricates the theory of material induction from 
the syllogistic fetters in which the logicians had entangled it. 
His design was, however, by no means, to exalt the dominion 
of Bacon ; but rather, all his labours are designed to draw the 
age from its one-sided culture — its too exclusive devotion to 
physics. We, therefore, standing, as we do, at the Baconian 
point of view of philosophy, step forward to hail the exposi- 
tions of Sir William Hamilton, and concatenate them with the 
philosophy of Bacon. So that the Baconian philosophy, in the 
future, may cease to be "the dirt philosophy" which some of 



48 

its heretical disciples have made it, and may embrace all the 
grand problems of thought which Sir William Hamilton has 
brought within the philosophy of common sense, and which 
Bacon certainly intended his philosophy to embrace. 



<rc:cr 

ccccr 
. cats;. 



cacc < 

recce c 



^CfliC^ 



© e 



C C C 

dec 






"- C^ <Z %^ ^:'- 






d ^^ ^ A/^ 



c. <, 



< c 

<^ c 

c c 
C c 

d CI 

C C 
^% 









c«rc«^c 















5^ 



<li<«^ 



<i^cac 









5?^ 









Ik 






oQc: ^5- 



<;<! 



CI C c 






S< ^:,c c^5 






^ crccr 
























J-,# >' I 



CCC c 









CCC< <-C<, 

a. ^ <^ <c<- 



C.CCCC 

eCccc 
CCCCC 

cCccX 

CO ' 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Dnve 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-21 1 1 




■"«^ r^ C 



. C^C 









. ^.<:. ^ <c:< 









«S. CI 



^ 









^ c 






^^c cng^r^xjc v^:^cc^ fei^ 



^: 

cc: 
CI 



^.<coc «s^_c c:c<.c: 
c«:x^ <sccc:c:ccc: 



^cc^ <r<c:c: 









o'er er^^ncKic^^ci^cr 



cI c: , co£i<sxy, < 



3:c<:: 

crcccr 

rc<: <z 

:<oc-<c: 






■ C'-C 






cccc 






Sc: 



cc: 






t:<ic; 
r<ac: 

CTvcr 









Q<:-<r 
•^c&^c c: 

^CCC^ C 

^C£C: ' 

I'^crc: 

_:cic: < 



CO 



iK< 



d<2cr 

cc: 

i 

CC 

cc 

^ c<r 
cc . 
CC 

cc 

cc 

cc 
<c 

cc 

' CC 

--. ^'< 
CC 



c 


c 


C'< 


c^ 


r 


c. 


C ( 




c 


C 


c 


C 


c 


c 


c 


c 


c- 


<, 


c^- 


( 


<i-i 


c 


' Ci-. 


c 


C'. • 


c 


cr«c 


c 


^<i< c 


<r<c< 


: C 


<Zii'(' 


C 


c^t< 


C" 


<^' -^ 


c 


C:c.( 


C 


^^^^ 


c: 


CT-cC 


C 


<s:c.- 


c 


<x:^^c 


c: 


i^x. 


C 


<§^(j. cc 


c 


^^!CfC 


< 









<r_ c^^j^ 



^&>c:i 



c_c<::i cs^c_ ^i 
^c;o: <3.<: V 



€3:: «r " <ic<r<r c: 



<^j^^c ^ « 
c<c 

JCI^C ^' 

c<c ', 

_^^.,CCC ' 
fHC<.cc c 

:ctc:"c 

^ C c 

j:Cv(C > 
-<^ c 

/Cs^.C 
„ Co C 



-cc <r^Krcji<: 



%^^Sfc 



cI <o:<^^ 

c:-c:c;< 
. Ciccf €- 

^cc.:C^ ^..^.^ 
. cicc.«;.^c.c^ 



c:<cici>-c 



cr d 
-_ dec: 

mcCl cc CI 



c:5'Ci_ c«c-c 



<3 c_ cc:<c 
C3 d OCjC 

ic:^ <:i. c^"-c:. 
^- dlOjC 
. cc dl c§: c._ 

<:c'..d_ad 
<l€j CH dC 

°c<i- d: <^c 



d €^^cgc 



deed 



dc <gr <'dcf^ 
d <t ds < 



dice 



dec 



d f 









'c:<i- X 

':cc. ^ 

rc_c<..' A 

rcc < 
_ CC<^ ^ 

"ce dc:- cccc ^B?^?^ 
42: <c<x: dc_. ^^ ' 

^M^~ dC ^< «CC<^J^ 

1:': i^rC. C^:C. ' 



. ^ «: dc 

^^;C ^ C./^^ .dC. 

dcc^ c a:i dec 

c^rc re cot: dc 

C C <3C d c 

.<c<^d c.<d d< 

= ^v^c.d c a:: ,^ c 
^^.^5d c^ - 



^" c 



d c*. c di <c (-<x cr c ^ '• c<^ 

dC'-'C d/'^^cCc d. cCvc< 

dc. c" d <ccd d c c .ci 

dec d_ C'^-d d'C d r<r 

C dji^c dl ^c' dcd c c c 



r^ d(^'^ <r '^cC/'edc<rVc 



